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The leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has called on his followers to end their struggle against Ankara, but will they listen?
The leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned in Türkiye since 1999, where his party is regarded as a terrorist organization, has made a statement that came as a surprise to many.
Öcalan has called on his supporters to abandon armed struggle and lay down their weapons. His message was announced by representatives of the pro-Kurdish leftist Party of Equality and Democracy (DEM).
Öcalan’s appeal was the result of agreements reached between him and the Turkish authorities. In his statement, he emphasized that the struggle of the Kurdish people for their rights and national identity, which began nearly half a century ago, has lost its relevance in light of the democratic reforms implemented by Türkiye since 2014 regarding the Kurdish minority. The PKK leader stated that armed resistance is no longer an effective means of achieving their goals and that the party should cease its activities.
Öcalan’s statement comes amid continued pressure from the Turkish authorities. In October 2024, the leader of the Turkish ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, urged Öcalan to issue a statement calling for the dissolution of the PKK in exchange for promises of political reforms and a possible easing of his detention conditions. It was an unexpected move, considering that Turkish nationalists had previously strongly opposed any compromises with the Kurdish movement.
Another factor influencing Öcalan’s statement was the change of power in Syria in December 2024, when the regime of Bashar Assad collapsed. The Kurdish population in the northern regions of Syria found itself in an uncertain situation, while Ankara intensified discussions with Damascus regarding joint actions against armed groups linked to the PKK. On January 8, 2025, the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet reported that Türkiye and Syria were considering launching a major military operation against Kurdish militant formations if the West attempted to push new demands on the Kurdish issue.
Following the fall of Assad’s government, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Syria should not become a “breeding ground for terrorism,” stressing the need to continue the fight against the PKK. Against this backdrop, Öcalan’s statement may be seen as an attempt to prevent further escalation of the conflict and seek a political solution to the longstanding Kurdish issue.
To understand the current events, it is essential to examine the historical context of the “Kurdish question” in Türkiye.
The Kurds are a people of approximately 30 million who do not have their own state. Historic Kurdistan spans territories that today belong to Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Kurds have their own language and distinct cultural traditions that set them apart from Turks, Arabs, and Persians.
Despite their numerical dominance in certain regions, the Kurds remained stateless throughout the 20th century. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed between some World War I Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire in 1920, but never ratified, envisioned the creation of an independent Kurdistan. This plan was then nullified by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. As a result, the Kurds were divided among four countries, turning from a majority in Kurdistan into a minority in each of these states.
The Kurdish struggle for national rights in Türkiye began as early as 1921. For decades, the Turkish state refused to recognize them as a distinct people, referring to Kurds as “mountain Turks” and imposing severe restrictions on their language and culture.
The situation began to change in the 1970s, when the Kurdish national liberation movement gained momentum. One of its key leaders was Abdullah Öcalan. While studying political science in Ankara, he was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas and, in 1978, founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The party was oriented toward anti-colonial socialism and had much in common with other leftist armed movements of that era, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In 1979, Öcalan left Türkiye and settled in Syria, where he began training militants for the struggle for Kurdistan’s independence. He received support from the Soviet Union and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who used the Kurds as a counterbalance against Türkiye, a NATO member.
In 1984, the PKK officially declared an uprising in Türkiye. Kurdish insurgents attacked police stations and gendarmerie bases in the country’s southeastern provinces. This led to a full-scale low-intensity conflict, which continues to this day despite periodic attempts at peaceful resolution.
Beyond Türkiye, Kurdish nationalist movements also developed in Iraq, where the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani were active. Efforts to unite Kurdish movements across different countries were unsuccessful. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Barzani became the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan, while Talabani became the president of Iraq.
Under Turkish pressure, Syria forced Öcalan to leave the country in 1998. He wandered through various countries for some time, even spending a few weeks in Russia. In February 1999, Turkish intelligence, with CIA support, captured him in Kenya and transported him to Türkiye. He was sentenced to death, but the sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Since then, he has been held in a high-security prison on the island of İmralı. His contact with the outside world is strictly limited, and in rare cases, intermediaries from pro-Kurdish political forces act as messengers.
Currently, this role is played by the Party of Equality and Democracy (DEM), whose representatives visited Öcalan on February 27. The visit was a landmark event, as it marked the first time in many years that his photograph was published alongside a public statement.
Türkiye-Kurdish relations: The policy of the current government
The relationship between Türkiye and the Kurds remains one of the key aspects of the country’s domestic policy. Despite the complex history of the conflict, it was under the current Turkish government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that significant attempts were made to resolve the situation. Over the years, the government has implemented reforms aimed at improving the status of the Kurdish population, granting them cultural and political rights, and launching peace negotiations with the PKK. However, these efforts did not yield the expected results, largely due to external interference, as even Türkiye’s Western NATO allies have repeatedly used the “Kurdish issue” as a tool to pressure Ankara.
In 2002, the official ban on the use of the Kurdish language in public spaces and private media was lifted. In 2004, Kurdish was allowed to be taught in private educational institutions and used on television. In 2009, the state-owned TRT Kurdi television channel, broadcasting in Kurdish, was launched – an important step toward recognizing Kurdish culture. In 2012, Kurdish was introduced as an optional subject in public schools.
In 2013, the so-called “Democratic Package” was announced, which aimed at expanding Kurdish rights. The use of the Kurdish language in election campaigns, previously prohibited, was legalized, and restrictions on letters not found in the Turkish alphabet but present in Kurdish, such as “W,”“X,” and “Q,” were lifted. Additionally, a process was initiated to restore the historical names of Kurdish villages and towns, which had previously been adapted to Turkish.
One of the most significant milestones in Ankara’s relations with the Kurdish movement was the 2013–2015 peace process. In 2013, Erdoğan initiated negotiations with the PKK and its imprisoned leader Öcalan. In 2014, legal reforms were enacted to allow open negotiations with the PKK and other Kurdish groups. A ceasefire lasted for two years, but it was broken in 2015 amid an escalation of the conflict and renewed armed clashes.
Beyond cultural and political reforms, the Turkish authorities invested significant resources in the development of infrastructure in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces. As part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, extensive efforts were made to build roads, hospitals, universities, and implement agricultural and industrial support programs. However, despite these efforts, unemployment and poverty levels in Kurdish regions remained higher than the national average.
As part of efforts to integrate Kurds into Türkiye’s political life, steps were taken to provide them with broader electoral participation opportunities. In 2014, pro-Kurdish parties were granted the right to run in elections without needing to form coalitions with major Turkish parties. As a result, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which had significant Kurdish support, surpassed the 10% electoral threshold for the first time and gained parliamentary representation in 2015.
However, after 2015, and especially following the attempted coup in 2016, the Turkish government’s policy towards the Kurds changed. The peace process was abandoned, and many pro-Kurdish politicians were arrested on charges of links to terrorist organizations. The Turkish Armed Forces intensified operations against the PKK in Syria and Iraq. In some cases, central authorities replaced elected Kurdish mayors in southeastern provinces with state-appointed administrators.
While many believe that repression of the Kurds has intensified under Erdoğan, it is also fair to acknowledge that his administration has done more than any previous government in modern Türkiye to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. There is no rigid rejection of Kurds as an ethnic group in Türkiye – many Kurds hold high-ranking government positions and are integrated into the country’s political system. However, the armed conflict with the PKK remains a major issue, and the ambiguous role of the West in this matter only complicates the reconciliation process.
Abdullah Öcalan’s call for his supporters to lay down their arms and end the armed struggle has sparked widespread reactions, becoming one of the region’s key political developments of early 2025. Although negotiations between the leader of the PKK and the Turkish authorities had been ongoing since at least October 2024, the very fact of his public statement is an event of historic significance.
Last year, the leader of Türkiye’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, proposed a radical solution to the Kurdish issue: if Öcalan officially declared the end of the PKK’s terrorist activities and its dissolution, it could open the possibility of his release or at least an easing of his prison conditions. It is notable that this initiative came from Bahçeli – an ultranationalist politician who had long advocated for a complete ban on pro-Kurdish political forces in Türkiye. Thus, the offer of reconciliation did not come from Kurdish supporters but from their most hardline opponent. This allowed Erdoğan to back the initiative without fear of being perceived as weak by his nationalist voter base.
The regional situation also played a crucial role. In February 2025, Syria’s transitional government concluded negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the key armed coalition of Syrian Kurds.
As a result, Kurdish militias agreed to integrate into Syria’s new armed forces, effectively marking the end of an independent Rojava (the self-proclaimed Kurdish autonomy in Syria). One of the conditions of the agreement was the expulsion of foreign fighters, including Kurdish militants from Türkiye. Whereas Syrian Kurds had previously viewed Rojava as a platform for national self-determination, the regime change in Damascus made them see an opportunity to integrate into the existing state structure. It is likely that Öcalan, following this logic, proposed a similar path for Turkish Kurds – to abandon armed struggle and integrate into Türkiye’s political system.
From a legal standpoint, such a move could grant Öcalan the “right to hope,” a Turkish principle that prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of sentence review. In February 2024, 25 years had passed since his arrest, and in theory, this period could allow the Turkish government to consider easing his punishment.
However, despite the significance of his statement, the question remains whether it will have a real impact on the situation. Today, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is far from a monolithic entity, and the Kurdish movement is fragmented across various organizations and countries. While Öcalan remains a symbolic figure, his control over armed groups is limited. The PKK’s operational leaders, who remain free, are hiding in the Qandil Mountains on the Iraq-Iran border. Turkish authorities have been trying to eliminate this group through airstrikes for years but have failed. It is Qandil that dictates the PKK’s strategy, and so far, there has been no response from there to Öcalan’s statement. In the past, these leaders have repeatedly stated that any settlement is only possible after the release of their founder, making their obedience to his call unlikely.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the official government, represented by the Barzani clan, has supported Öcalan’s initiative, but its influence over the PKK is minimal. The Barzani family has traditionally been at odds with the PKK, and their words hold little authority for its supporters.
Rojava is formally not affiliated with the PKK, but its dominant political force, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), adheres to Öcalan’s ideology. The party’s leader, Salih Muslim, stated that Syrian Kurds are willing to follow Öcalan’s call but added that laying down arms is only possible if guarantees for political activity are provided.
Thus, despite the significance of Öcalan’s statement, the likelihood of it leading to an immediate end to the conflict remains extremely low. The Kurdish movement is too fragmented, and armed groups continue to operate as independent actors. However, this appeal creates a unique window of opportunity for a peaceful settlement, which, under favorable circumstances, could lead to a gradual de-escalation of tensions. The question is whether the Turkish authorities and international mediators will be able to seize this moment for real political progress.
The Kurdish issue, alongside the broader Middle Eastern conflict, remains one of the entire region’s fundamental challenges. Unfortunately, both Western powers and regional players often exploit the Kurds as a political tool to pressure Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. However, it is crucial to recognize that Kurdish leaders should prioritize integration within the states where they reside, rather than pursuing the creation of an independent state. Such a move could trigger a dangerous chain reaction, leading to endless ethno-sectarian conflicts across the Middle East, further destabilizing an already fragile region.
